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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968
WILLIAM J. VIZZARD*
For three decades, the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) has formed the
legal core of national gun policy in the United States. The congressional
deliberations leading to the passage of the GCA and companion legislation
extended over five years and involved the Departments of Justice and
Treasury, the White House, firearms interest groups, and both houses of
Congress. At no time before or since has Congress addressed gun control
policy with as much breadth or depth.1 Although the National Firearms Act
(NFA) of 1934 imposed strict federal regulation on machine guns and other
“gangster” firearms2 using taxation legislation, the 1938 Federal Firearms Act
(FFA) had proven ineffectual in asserting even minimal federal controls over
interstate commerce in ordinary handguns, shotguns and rifles.3 The structure
of the GCA emerged largely from observed weaknesses in the existing FFA.4
The Dodd Hearings
In early 1958, Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced
legislation to control the importation of surplus military firearms.5 Clearly
protectionist, the legislation targeted the increase in imported firearms, the
great majority of which were military surplus.6 Congress acted only to ban the
importation of previously exported U.S. military firearms.7 The flood of
imports continued, fueled by surplus World War II firearms and inexpensive
pistols and revolvers.8

*

Associate Professor, Division of Criminal Justice, California State UniversitySacramento.
1. William J. Vizzard, The Impact of Agenda Conflict on Policy Formulation and
Implementation: The Case of Gun Control, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 341, 344 (1995) [hereinafter
Vizzard, Agenda]. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of
1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133 (1975).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 5848 (1958).
3. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 140-43.
4. Id. at 140.
5. S. 3714, 85th Cong., (1958) (enacted).
6. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 144.
7. 22 U.S.C. § 1934(b) (1958).
8. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 144. Id. at 145.
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Upon assuming the chairmanship of the Juvenile Justice Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1961, Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT)
directed the staff to conduct a study of mail order sales of firearms.9 After two
years of staff study, Senator Dodd introduced his first gun bill, Senate Bill
1975 and opened hearings to generate public interest in the gun issue.10 The
bill required mail-order purchasers of handguns to provide the seller a
notarized affidavit stating they were over eighteen years of age and legally
entitled to purchase the firearm and restricted the importation of surplus
military firearms.11 The bill had input from the Treasury Department and
received support from both the firearms industry and the NRA.12
After the assassination of President Kennedy with a mail order, surplus
military rifle, Senator Dodd amended his bill to include long guns under the
mail order restrictions.13 The bill died in the Senate Commerce Committee in
1964,14 but Senator Dodd reintroduced the bill as Senate Bill 14 in January of
1965.15 Two months later, he introduced a more restrictive bill, Senate Bill
1592, at the request of the administration, and the political battle over gun
control began.16 Although various members of Congress introduced a variety
of gun bills during the period between 1964 and 1968, the Dodd Bill became a
generic description for all pending legislation, particularly among opponents of
firearms control legislation. Between 1938 and 1965, Congress had displayed
little discernable interest in gun control legislation; however, external events,
administration interest, and public opinion altered the policy dynamics within
Congress over the next four years and opened the policy window17 Events
during this period also foreshadowed the form and dynamics of the gun issue
for years to come.
The shift, by the leadership of the National Rifle Association (NRA), from
cautious support for the original Dodd Bill to modest opposition of Senate Bill
1592 foreshadowed the most significant and lasting change in the dynamics of
gun control policy to occur in the twentieth century. The NRA and firearms
9. Id. at 145.
10. Id.
11. Id. Neal Knox, The 30-Year War for Gun Ownership, GUNS AND AMMO, Aug., 1988, at
PAGE NUMBER.
12. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 146.
13. Id.
14. 110 CONG. REC. 18,431 (1964) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
15. 111 CONG. REC. 200 (1965) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
16. Federal Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 89the Cong. 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dodd).
17. Federal Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 90th Cong. 3 (1967) [hereinafter 1967
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dodd). 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 213 (Statement of
Franklin Orth, NRA Executive Secretary).
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manufacturers had supported Dodd’s original bill and the subsequent addition
of interstate controls on long guns.18 Although the official organ of the NRA,
The American Rifleman, indicated otherwise, the NRA leadership displayed
some willingness to compromise with Dodd as late as 1965.19 Negative
response by the membership precipitated a subsequent reversal of direction by
the NRA leadership.20 This uprising by a significant portion of the NRA
membership owed much to the development of a specialized gun press that
catered to the most avid of gun enthusiasts.21 The editorial staffs of magazines
such as Guns, Guns and Ammo, and Gun Week inalterably opposed gun control
in any form and benefited from heightened interest in gun issues.22 By 1965,
the leadership and membership of the NRA divided along a fault line
separating those tolerant of moderate increases in gun control from those
opposed to any significant change in the law.23 Although the NRA leadership
responded to this internal pressure with increased opposition to new
legislation, their policy shift failed to satisfy a powerful segment within the
membership. This internal dissatisfaction within the NRA provided the
impetus for a 1977 coup by the libertarian faction within the organization and
the ouster of the more moderate old guard.24 Although the relations between
Chairman Dodd and the NRA witnesses remained marginally cordial during
the 1965 hearings, the atmosphere had begun to chill. Any hope of
compromise between advocates of stricter gun control and the NRA ended
after 1965.
The 1965 hearings also shaped the future dynamics of the subcommittee.
Over the next three years Dodd assumed the role of spokesman for a series of
progressively more restrictive bills drafted by the administration. Relations
between Dodd and ranking minority member, Roman Haruska (R-NE), became
progressively strained.25 Although his rural constituency and conservative

18. Id. at 196, 212 (statement of Franklin Orth). 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 495
(statement of Franklin Orth).
19. Knox, supra note 10-2, at PAGE NUMBER. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 211-12, 218
(statement of Franklin Orth and Harlon Carter, NRA President).
20. Knox, supra note 10-2, at PAGE NUMBER. 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 495
(statement of Franklin Orth).
21. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 212 (statement of Sen. Dodd and Franklin Orth).
22. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 618, 623-27 (statement of Sen. Dodd and Thomas J.
Siatos, Publisher and Editorial Director of Guns and Ammo Magazine). Interview with Neal
Knox, Reporter for Gun Week, in CITY, STATE (Mar. 1993).
23. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 212, 215 (statement of Franklin and Harlon Carter).
Interview with Neal Knox, supra note 19-2.
24. JOSH SUGARMANN, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION: MONEY, FIREPOWER, AND FEAR
45-52 (1992). OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR GUN
CONTROL 34-35 (1993). Interview with Neal Knox, supra note 19-2.
25. Interview with Peter W. Velde, Minority Counsel for the Subcommittee and retained
close ties to Senator Haruska, in Alexandria, Virginia (Mar. 22, 1993) [hereinafter VELDE],
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view of the federal role predisposed Haruska toward a skeptical view on gun
control, he lacked any ties to the gun lobby or any personal stake in the gun
issue.26 Apparently, the personal relationship between Haruska and Dodd
directly influenced committee dynamics and the formulation of policy.27
Both the House and Senate conducted hearings on a number of proposed
pieces of legislation between 1963 and 1968. Although these various bills bore
different designations during different sessions of Congress, they can be
somewhat simplified. The original Dodd proposal, Senate Bill 1975, would
have restricted importation of surplus military firearms and required sworn
affidavits of eligibility to purchase a handgun by mail. The seller would have
been required to mail the affidavit to the chief law enforcement officer of the
purchaser’s jurisdiction. Dodd reintroduced this same bill as Senate Bill 14 in
1965, and Haruska again introduced essentially the same bill as Senate Bill
1853 in 1967.28 Although Dodd introduced Senate Bill 14, he soon shifted his
support and the attention of his subcommittee hearings to Senate Bill 1592, a
bill largely drafted by the administration. The majority of the 1965 gun control
hearings concerned this bill; which prohibited interstate mail order sales and
interstate over-the-counter sales of handguns to individuals, increased dealer
fees from one to 100 dollars, extended controls to ammunition, restricted
destructive devices and prohibited sales by dealers to minors.29 Existing law
already prohibited sales by dealers to felons and certain other classes of
persons.
The Administration Ups the Ante
In 1967, Dodd reintroduced Senate Bill, 1592 as Senate Bill 1 but soon
introduced Amendment 90 to Senate Bill 1 (hereafter “Senate Bill 1 as
amended”) in response to administration proposals. Rather than amending the
existing Federal Firearms Act, Senate Bill 1 as amended replaced the FFA with
a new law. It also extended the interstate prohibition on mail order sales of
noting that the acrimony is often apparent between Senators Dodd and Haruska on both a
personal and philosophical level during the hearings. See Federal Firearms Act, 1968: Hearings
on S. 3604 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Comm. of the Senate
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 592-93 (1968) (statement of James Bennett, President, National Council for
a National Firearms Policy) [hereinafter 1968 Hearings]. See also, ROBERT SHERRILL,
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 68-69 (1973).
26. VELDE, supra note 22-1. “My review of Haruska’s statements in committee support
Velde’s view and my research revealed no documentation linking Haruska to the NRA.” Id.
27. Id. Velde contended the Haruska’s opposition to much of Todd’s legislation resulted
largely from his dislike of Dodd and his belief that attempting to steam roll over minority
objections. A review of Haruska’s questioning during several years of hearings also reveals a
very strong emphasis on the rural perspective and concern for the impact of law on individuals.
Id.
28. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 12-15. 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 20-23, 31.
29. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 6-12.
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handguns to all guns and prohibited interstate transactions between individuals.
Senate Bill 1 as amended also reduced dealer license fees to twenty-five
dollars and removed controls on ammunition.30 A companion bill, Senate Bill
1854, placed destructive devices under the NFA as items requiring registration
and tax payment.31 Senator Haruska had advanced this approach for some time
in lieu of placing such items in the FFA.
Senator Haruska’s reintroduction of the original Dodd bill as Senate Bill
1853 provided a compromise position for Senators fearing constituencies on
both ends of the gun issue. With strong NRA opposition to Senate Bill 1 as
amended and an alternative bill to divide support, the probability of passing a
comprehensive gun bill appeared low. External events suddenly altered the
policy agenda. The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. opened the
policy window and altered the political dynamics in the Judiciary Committee.32
On April 29, 1968, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a bill
resembling Dodd’s Senate Bill 1 as amended, with the exception of a ban on
interstate sales of long guns, as Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act (hereafter Title IV).33 On May 23, 1968, the full Senate
amended the Omnibus bill by adding Title VII (hereafter Title VII), which
prohibited felons and certain other classes of individuals from receiving,
possessing or transporting a firearm in or affecting commerce.34 The Senate
passed Senate Bill 917 as amended, the Omnibus Act, on May 24, 1968, and
sent it to the House.35 The policy window had opened in the Senate, but the
House remained a potential obstacle.
Breakthrough
A second assassination pried open further the policy window and assured
House passage. On June 5, 1968, an assessin murdered presidential candidate
and United States Senator Robert Kennedy. The following day, the House
passed the Omnibus Act, including Titles IV and VII.36 Ironically, after years
in formulation Title IV never became effective. Before the effective date of
implementation, Congress passed the somewhat more comprehensive GCA.37

30. 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 124-27.
31. Id. at 24.
32. VELDE, supra note 22-1. Velde stated that the committee was engaged in marking up
Haruska’s as Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Bill, and that the full committee was evenly divided
between the supporters of the Haruska bill and the Dodd bill, with Chairman Eastland favoring
the Haruska bill. After the assassination, two proxy votes shifted the balance in favor of Dodd’s
bill, which the committee passed after deleting restrictions on interstate long gun sales.
33. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 at 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112.
34. 114 CONG. REC. 14775 (daily ed. May 23, 1968).
35. Id. at 14798.
36. Id. at 16300.
37. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1214 (Oct. 22, 1968).
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The GCA extended interstate restrictions to all firearms and incorporated
ammunition.38 It also revised the NFA by the addition of destructive devices
to the restricted categories and by restricting future registrations of firearms
made or transferred in violation of the law.39
Although Title IV of the Omnibus Act and the later GCA reflected
extensive hearings and staff work, Title VII benefited from no such history. At
the last minute, the Senate inserted Title VII into its version of the Omnibus
Act by voice vote.40 Proposed by Senator Russell Long (D-LA) and
considered without hearings, the bill suffered from poor drafting which would
bedevil its enforcers and confound the courts.41 Title VII addressed simple
firearm possession for the first time at the federal level. The bill included a
finding that strongly implied such intent,42 and Senator Long’s statements on
the Senate floor likewise support such an interpretation.43 Apparently, a bill
intended to significantly alter federal policy became law with little analysis
largely as a political favor to improve its author’s image as tough on crime.44
The new momentum generated by the Robert Kennedy assassination
continued to alter the political dynamics of the gun control issue through the
summer and fall of 1968. In earlier years, congressional mail, dominated by
gun control opponents, generated fear even among many liberal members of
supporting significant legislation.45 Although opinion polls reflected broadbased support for stricter controls on firearms, this support failed to translate

38. Id. § 921(a)(3).
39. Id. § 921(a)(4).
40. 114 CONG. REC. 14775 (daily ed. May 23, 1968).
41. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). The court contributed the following
observation: “the statute does not read well under either view”. Id. at 339. The court also
observed that “the legislative history of (the) Act hardly speaks with that clarity of purpose which
Congress supposedly furnishes courts”. Id. at 346, citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 483 (1951). Finally, the court reiterated the government’s contention that “the statute is
not a model of logic or clarity. Id. at 347.
42. See id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. See 114 CONG. REC. 14773-75 (daily ed. May 23, 1968) (response of Sen. Long to Sen.
McClellan).
44. VELDE, supra note 22-1. Velde stated that Sen. Long made a personal appeal to his
colleagues for last minute inclusion of Title VII into the Omnibus bill without a hearing based on
his perception of needs for the next election. According to Velde, subsequent changes were to be
made in committee but the law was passed on a voice vote and no changes could be made. Some
Senators and staff members considered the section of the law making possession of a firearm by
the employee of a felon unconstitutional. See also, 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 69
(statement of Ramsey Clark, U.S. Attorney General). See also, Stevens v. United States, 440
F.2d 144 (1971) (thoroughly reviewing the legislative history of the bill).
45. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 422 (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings). Id. at 1099
(statement of Sen. George McGovern).
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into constituent demand.46 After the 1968 assassinations of Robert Kennedy
and Martin Luther King a groundswell of visible support for more decisive
federal action temporarily materialized.47
During the summer of 1968, gun control advocates in Congress tested the
limits of the new policy dynamics with the introduction of bills calling for
registration and licensing of firearms.48 Senator Joseph Tydings (D-MD), who
replaced Senator Dodd as the most visible congressional proponent of gun
control over the next two years,49 introduced one of four major bills relating to
registration and licensing. Senate Bill 3634 would have established national
firearm registration and required a license issued by the Secretary of Treasury
to possess a firearm. The bill allowed the states to substitute state licensing for
federal licensing. The administration advanced Senate Bill 3691, which
mandated federal licensing if the states failed to act.50 The Administration
proposed the use of licensed federal firearm dealers as licensing agents,
following the pattern of hunting and fishing licenses.51 The Administration bill
contained two cumbersome requirements: that applicants provide certification
from a doctor regarding their mental state and certification from the local
police regarding their residence and lack of criminal record. Similar in
structure and intent, Senate Bill 3634 and Senate Bill 3691 both allowed and
encouraged the states to develop firearms owner licensing but mandated
federal licensing if the states failed to act.52
Senator Edward Brooke (R-MA) and Senator Dodd also introduced
registration bills of less sweeping proportions. Brooke’s bill, Senate Bill 3637,
required registration through local police authorities but not a license to
possess a firearm. Dodd’s bill, Senate Bill 3604, also required registration but
contained no licensing provisions.
Following the passage of the Omnibus Act, the Dodd subcommittee
continued gun control hearings focused almost exclusively on these
registration and licensing bills.53 Although the summer of 1968 marked the
high water mark for gun control on the national policy agenda, none of the
46. See The Gallop Organization, Eight in Ten Persons Favor Law Requiring Police Permit
for Gun, PUB. OPINION NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 12, 1964).
47. 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 579-82 (statement of James Bennett, President,
National Council for Responsible Firearm Policy); Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Dodd).
48. Gun Controls Extended to Long Guns, Ammunition, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
ANNUAL ALMANAC 225 (1969).
49. Tydings was defeated in 1970 with considerable opposition form gun interests.
Although the impact of his support for gun control on the election remains unclear, the defeat
came to symbolize the risk of supporting gun control for the next twenty years.
50. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 57-59 (statement of Attorney General Ramsey
Clark). S. 3634 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). S. 3691 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
51. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 58.
52. Id. at 59.
53. 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2.
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registration bills came close to passage. In October, Congress passed the GCA
to replace Title IV of the Omnibus Act after a spirited debate in both the House
and Senate and a flurry of motions by both supporters and opponents of gun
control.54 The GCA constituted the last major gun control bill to pass
Congress until the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, which reduced a
number of the controls imposed by the GCA.55 Not until the Brady Act of
1994, would Congress again pass significant control legislation.56 The final
bill constituted only a modest revision of the already passed Title IV of the
Omnibus Act.
The Law
The GCA actually consisted of two distinct subdivisions or titles, located
in different titles of the federal code.57 In addition, Title VII of the Omnibus
Act (hereafter Title VII) was the functional equivalent of a third subdivision of
the GCA, although it constituted a separate piece of legislation.58 The majority
of the GCA, Title I (hereafter the GCA), regulated all firearms and was located
in Title 18 of the Untied States Code (the Criminal Code) as was Title VII.
Title II (hereafter the NFA) incorporated the existing National Firearms Act,
with minor additions. The NFA remained a tax statute, in law if not in fact,
within Title 26 of the United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code). It
retained the existing scheme of registration to enforce the making, transfer
taxes and special occupational taxes required by the 1934 Act.59 The primary
changes to the NFA consisted of the addition of destructive devices to the
previously enumerated categories of so called gangster weapons, and the
termination of authority to register existing NFA firearms after an initial
amnesty period.60 The category of destructive devices included weapons with
a bore exceeding one-half inch in diameter, explosive and poison gas bombs,
projectiles with explosive warheads and rockets and missiles.61 While this
change attracted little attention at the time, it conferred upon the Bureau of
54. ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 144-45 (1995).
55. Vizzard, Agenda, supra note 1, at 344.
56. Id. at 343.
57. The use of title is somewhat confusing in this context. Normally used to refer to separate
federal codes, it concurrently defines subdivisions in the act.
58. Ultimately incorporated into a single act, the GCA and Title VII ware routinely viewed
as one piece of legislation by those implementing the law.
59. The NFA did not prohibit machine guns and other regulated firearms but imposed a $200
tax on the making or transfer of such weapons. The law included registration provisions to assure
the payment of the tax in advance. Special occupational tax payers, dealers, and manufacturers,
could pay a yearly tax that exempted them from the tax on individual weapons but not from
registration requirements. See 26 U.S.C. 53 (YEAR).
60. The firearms originally covered by 26 U.S.C. 5845 included machine guns, silencers,
short-barreled rifles, shotguns, and other unique fire arms.
61. 26 U.S.C. 5845(f) (1968).
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Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) jurisdiction over the primary federal
law relating to bombing.62 Although future legislation expanded the
jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) over bombings, ATF
retained joint jurisdiction in this area and later extended that jurisdiction into
commercial arson.63
Between 1934 and 1968, Treasury Department policy allowed persons
without criminal records to register NFA firearms possessed in technical
violation of the law when the violation was not willfull nor the firearm in
violation of state law.64 The new law provided for a thirty-day amnesty period
during which any person possessing an NFA firearm could register it without
restrictions.65 No information provided in furtherance of registration could be
released to state authorities or used to prosecute the registrant for any crime
other than false statements in the registration application.66 The amnesty and
nondisclosure provisions overcame the defense of self incrimination
established by Haynes v. U.S.67 While this legal strategy served to eliminate a
short term impediment to enforcing the registration provisions of the NFA, it
established a precedent that may prove troublesome in any future effort to
pursue general registration or licensing of firearms.68
Although the GCA created no comprehensive system of control or
regulation of firearms in the possession of individual citizens, it significantly
altered the rules governing commercial firearms transactions. It prohibited
engaging in the business of manufacturing, importing or dealing in firearms
without first obtaining a federal license.69 Licensees were prohibited from
selling firearms to out-of-state residents, minors, felons, persons under
indictment for felonies, fugitives and certain other categories of persons70 and
required to maintain records of all sales.71 The law prohibited interstate mail

62. WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, IN THE CROSS FIRE, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND FIREARMS 40-41 (1997) [hereinafter VIZZARD, Cross Fire].
63. Id. at 64.
64. Author’s experience as Special Investigator with Alcohol, Tobacco Tax Division in 1967
and 1968.
65. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1214 (Oct. 22, 1968).
66. 26 U.S.C. 5848(a) (1968).
67. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). Possessors could no longer claim that the
act of registration would subject them to risk of prosecution, thus requiring self-incrimination.
68. The justification for any national firearms registration and licensing system depends
largely upon the utility of the registration information for general law enforcement. See William
J. Vizzard, A Systematic Approach to Controlling Firearm Markets, J. FIREARMS & PUBLIC
POL’Y (1997). This precedent if extended to a general registration scheme, would preclude use of
that information.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(a) (Lexis 1999).
70. Id. § 922(b)(1)-(3). Id. § 922(d).
71. Id. § 922(b)(5).
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order sales and tightly restricted intrastate mail order sales.72 Manufacturers
and importers had to begin identifying every firearm by stamping the name of
the manufacturer or importer and a serial number on the receiver.73 Firearms
not suitable for sporting purposes and surplus military firearms were restricted
from importation.74
The GCA prohibited dealers from delivering firearms to felons and several
other categories of persons and those same classes of persons from receiving
firearms that had moved in commerce,75 but failed to address possession by
these persons. The GCA also ignored transfers by individuals to felons and
other restricted categories, while prohibiting transfers to out of state
residents.76 Title VII prohibited felons and certain other categories of persons
from receiving, possessing or transporting firearms in commerce; however, the
categories enumerated by Title VII differed slightly from those in the GCA.77
In addition, the question of whether Title VII applied to simple possession
remained unanswered for several years. Following the passage of Title VII,
the Departments of Treasury and Justice assumed a very cautious posture
toward prosecution of felons for possession of firearms. Until the 1971
decision in United States v. Bass (hereafter Bass),78 policy virtually precluded
federal prosecution of felons for possession of firearms except in cases where
the government could directly prove interstate transportation or receipt by the
defendant.79 Even after Bass, prosecutorial policy remained conservative until
1977, when the Supreme Court affirmed that prior interstate movement of a
firearm fulfilled the “in or effecting commerce” element of possession.80
Although subsequent statutory changes merged the prohibitions against
possession of firearms “in or affecting commerce” by felons and others into the
72. Id. § 922(a)(2). Id. § 922(c).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 923(i).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). Id. § 922(h). The excepting persons being under 18 years of age for
long guns and under 21 years of age for handguns. No restriction on receipt existed for these
classes.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5).
77. 18 U.S.C. Appx. 1202(a) (repleaded 1986) applied to persons who had been covicted of
a felony, dishonorably discharged for the armed forces, adjudicated mentally incompetent,
renounced their citizenship or who were aliens unlawfully in the country. Section 922(h) applied
to persons who were under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by more than one
year imprisonment, fugitives from justice, unlawful users of prohibited drugs, adjudicated
mentally defective, or committed to a metal institution.
78. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). Although the Court adopted a restrictive view of the
statutory wording that required the government to prove “possession in commerce,” a footnote in
the decision suggested that prior movement of the firearm in interstate commerce would fulfill
that element. This provided the government with a practical means of charging possession in
most cases.
79. Based upon the author’s experience as a Special Agent with the ATF during those years.
80. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
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GCA,81 Title VII provided the only functional federal restriction on possession
for almost a decade. Even the incorporation of the prohibition into the GCA
did not address the complexities raised by the need for proof of interstate
nexus. Section 922(g) of 18 U.S.C. simply incorporated the same, [possess in
or affecting commerce,” language that previously existed in Section 1202(a)].
Thus the requirement to establish interstate nexus in every case, adopted as a
result of Bass, remained. Although evidence of prior interstate shipment
ordinarily fills the “affecting commerce” requirement, firearms seized in their
state of manufacture constitute an exception.82 The ambiguous syntax of the
original Title VII and the failure of its congressional finding to satisfy the
interstate requirement have resulted in law that neither restricts its reach to true
commerce nor efficiently addresses all possession. The perpetuation and
incorporation of the possession restriction demonstrates an apparent
congressional intent to establish a federal prohibition against firearm
possession by felon and certain other high risk offenders, yet this intent has not
translated into corrective legislation to address the faults incorporated in the
1968 law.83
In addition to not directly addressing the possession of firearms by highrisk classes, the GCA provided no authorization for an oversight mechanism to
insure that licensed dealers did not transfer firearms to such persons. Although
dealers were required to maintain a record of gun disposition and obtain
identification and a signed certification of eligibility from the purchaser, they
had no means for determining eligibility.84 While the original GCA required
dealers to submit such reports as the Secretary might require, the Treasury
Department made no effort to include a reporting requirement on sales in the
implementing regulations.85 The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986
specifically prohibited such a requirement,86 and the Brady Law of 1994
instituted required reporting for the sole purpose of screening buyers.87
The preamble to the GCA defined its purpose as providing support to state
efforts at firearm regulation without placing a burden on legitimate firearm
users.88 These themes dominated the entire law. The first theme appeared in
81. 18 U.S.C. § 933(g).
82. On some occasions, manufacturers ship to wholesalers in another state, who ship the
firearm back to the state of origin. In these cases, prior interstate movement can be documented
through dealer records.
83. The improvisation of investigators and prosecutors has reduced pressure to address the
problems of drafting. Most firearms have traveled in interstate commerce and thus meet the
current standard of federal nexus.
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (requiring maintenance of records prescribed by the
Secretary); 27 C.F.R. § 178.121(H) (1999) (specifying the required records).
85. Interview with Rex Davis, former ATF Director, in CITY, STATE (Mar. 23, 1993).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s).
88. § 101 (titled Purpose of Public Law 90-618).
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the provisions prohibiting acquisition outside one’s state of residence,
interstate mail order sales, and delivery to out-of-state residents or persons who
would be in violation of local or state law by possessing such a firearm. The
second theme appears in a number of provisions including: exemptions for
purchase of guns in contiguous states, provisions for intrastate mail order sales
by dealers, and provision for replacement of guns lost or broken by nonresidents on hunting trips. Presumably, this concern about placing burdens on
individuals accounts for the lack of controls on transactions between
individuals. Concerns about the burden of licensing on small rural businesses
manifested themselves in the ten dollar yearly license fee and concerns for
collectors resulted in the collector license for curios and relics.89
Structural Issues
A fundamental deficiency in the law resulted from the failure to define the
term “engaged in the business of dealing in firearms”. Although the law
required any person engaged in this activity to obtain a license and provided
felony penalties for failure to do so,90 it included no definition or statutory
presumption to clarify this crucial term. This lack of definition was the source
of much of the subsequent conflict over the implementation of the law and
generated considerable difficulties for gun enthusiasts and law enforcement.91
The ambiguity resulting from a failure to define “engaging in the business”
interfaced with other structural shortcomings to generate years of conflict over
the entire licensing process.92 The law required the issuance of a dealer license
within sixty days to any applicant declaring an intention to engage in the
business from a premises, unless the applicant was under 21 years of age or fell
into the one of the categories of persons prohibited from possessing firearms.93
These minimal criteria, combined with a license fee of only ten dollars per
year, assured issuance of licenses to numerous individuals desiring the
convenience of a license but lacking actual intent to engage in a legitimate
business enterprise.94 Because Congress granted no discretion in the issuance
of licenses, the ATF could address this issue only after an inspection had
revealed a failure to engage in the business. This placed ATF in the awkward
position of revoking or denying renewal of a license for failing to engage in the

89. 18 U.S.C. § 923(b). 27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (defines curios and relics).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).
91. VIZZARD, Cross Fire, supra note 59, at 67-68.
92. Id. See also Phillip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 § J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 59, 75-76 (1995).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(2).
94. Possession of a license allows an individual to order firearms directly from a variety of
wholesalers, often at substantial savings.
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business rather than for some intentional violation of the law or the
regulations.95
Although many license applicants had no intent of carrying on a
commercial enterprise, many persons who actually sold firearms commercially
resisted licensing and its requirements to conduct business from a fixed
premises and maintain records of purchasers.96 Thus, ATF found itself
concurrently prosecuting unlicensed dealers for what appeared to be casual
sales, while encouraging other casual sellers to surrender their licenses. The
results proved disastrous for ATF, although the contradictions existed more in
appearances than fact.97 These problems could have easily been avoided with
higher dealer fees, a definition of “engaging in business” based on the number
of sales or offers per year, modest licensing discretion and elimination of the
requirement that licensees engage in the business.98 Efforts at minimizing the
burden on licensees and restriction of bureaucratic discretion generated serious
implementation problems.
As with many federal regulatory statutes, the GCA granted authority to the
ATF to promulgate regulations spelling out specific procedures under the
law.99 While regulatory agencies may exercise significant discretionary
authority through administrative regulations, this has not proven the case for
the regulations authorized under the GCA. The regulations restrict themselves
to filling in routine details for activities spelled out in the law. In light of the
hostile congressional reaction to the only effort at utilizing the regulations to
increase the reach of the statute, the narrow drafting appears to reflect
congressional will.100
Thus, the GCA and Title VII imposed procedures on persons in the gun
business and established classifications for persons ineligible to receive and
possess firearms from dealers or in interstate commerce. With the exception of
the NFA restrictions on machine guns and certain other unusual firearms, the
law applied to all modern firearms equally.101 Individuals, other than felons
and certain other prohibited persons, were affected little, by the law. Although
most persons could not acquire a firearm outside their state of residence, only a

95. VIZZARD, Cross Fire, supra note 59, at 67. The ATF never pursued a policy of
revocation, but routinely refused to renew licenses. More often they convinced the licensee to
surrender his license voluntarily.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 66-68.
98. The purpose of regulatory law and licensing is to assure compliance with procedures or
competency. The desire or lack thereof to make sales is an irrational criterion for qualification.
A fee adequate to cover issuing and inspection costs would have limited the number of licenses
without placing the government in this irrational position.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 926(a); 27 C.F.R. §§ 178, 179 (contains regulations).
100. VIZZARD, Cross Fire, supra note 59, at 55-56.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

92

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:79

small minority of persons desired to do so.102 The law terminated the nation’s
totally laissez faire policy on gun commerce. Although proceeded by
extensive hearings, the law generated numerous implementation problems.
In Retrospect
Events surrounding the passage of the GCA provide some insight to the
policy process and the nature of gun control as an issue. From the interest
group perspective, the events present a rather straight forward and well-defined
scenario with the groups divided into two fairly discreet camps. The events
differed from a classic clash of interest groups only in that the pro-control
advocates included neither a broad-based organization specifically committed
to gun control or any organization with an economic stake. The only
organized special interest group solely devoted to gun control, the National
Council for Responsible Firearms Policy, consisted of only about fifty
prominent, though not essentially powerful, citizens.103 Although the procontrol position received some support from groups with more widespread
membership, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Policy (IACP)
and the American Bar Association, these groups pursued a variety of interests
and issues other than firearms.104 The pro-control forces did enjoy two key
sources of support. The Johnson Administration consistently supported a more
comprehensive federal gun statute, although the Justice Department provided
more support than did the Treasury Department. Justice lawyers drafted the
most restrictive proposals, and Justice officials testified in their support.
Although less active on policy formulation, Treasury officials consistently
supported the administration position.105 The advocates of control also
enjoyed widespread support in most of the national media.106

102. The combination of excluding firearms manufactured before 1898 and creating a
collector license for firearms over 50 years old allowed substantial interstate shipment of collector
arms. Individuals could also obtain firearms from out of state by having them shipped through a
dealer in the state of acquisition.
103. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 841. (statement of Leonard S. Blondes, Vice
President of the National Council for a Responsible Firearms Policy).
104. Representatives of both groups appeared on several occasions before Congressional
committees in support of the Dodd bills and IACP supported both licensing and registration. See
1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 526 (statement of Quinn Tamm).
105. A reading of testimony by Justice and Treasury representatives reflects that Justice was
clearly in the lead on policymaking while Treasury was more focused on details of
implementation. At congressional hearings, Justice was extensively represented by the Attorney
General while an Assistant Secretary or the Commissioner of Internal revenue usually represented
Treasury. Justice’s dominant policy role became most clear in 1968 with the introduction of
licensing and registration proposals.
106. See Rep. John V. Lindsay, Speaking Out—Too Many People Have Guns, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Feb. 1, 1964 at 12. Fire at Will, WASH. POST., June 26, 1968, at A1. Guns Must
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The opponents more closely approached the classic interest group model.
First among equals, the NRA benefited directly from the heightened interest
generated by the legislative hearings and debates. Its membership rose rapidly
during this period, reaching 700,000 by 1965 and 1,000,000 by 1968.107
Although it supported Senator Haruska’s bill as an alternative to more
restrictive legislation, the NRA solidified its position of leadership in
opposition to all other control proposals with support from associations of arms
collectors, manufacturer and shooters. The membership of these groups
overlapped substantially, in fact, most members of these other groups were
likely NRA members.108 Although some have characterized the opposition as
a classic economic interest group with the NRA acting as a front for arms
manufacturers, the record provides little support for this interpretation.109
In the case of gun control during the 1960’s, the interest groups, or factions
in Madison’s words, did not resemble the general concept of interest groups
based on economic interest, class interest, geography or ethnicity. Control
advocates consisted of a loosely organized elite, focused on a perceived public
interest issue with support from the administration and presumably from much
of the public. Although principally composed of narrow special interest
groups, control opponents enjoyed a very broad-based support that did not
grow primarily from economic self-interest. While this support was most
concentrated in rural areas it spanned class and geography.
Advocates for both positions utilized similar strategies to prevail. Political
theorist E. E. Schattschneider characterized advocates in the American political
system as expanding political conflicts by attempting to bring the audience into
the conflict.110 Both sides followed this pattern. The advocates used the press
and the hearings themselves to create demand for legislation. The opposition
utilized the special interest press and direct mailings for the same purpose,

Go, ADVERTISING AGE, June 17, 1968, at 1. James V. Bennett, The Gun and How to Control It,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE., Sept. 25, 1996, at 34.
107. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 212 (statement of Franklin Orth). 1968 Hearings,
supra note 22-2, at 399 (statement of Harold Glassen).
108. In the author’s experience virtually all competitive shooters and arms collectors are NRA
members. Although many hunters are not, those who are members of outdoors associations likely
are. In some cases, those who testified for those groups also held key positions in the NRA. See
1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 296 (statement of C. R. Gutermuth, Vice President of Wildlife
Management Institute).
109. The Dodd bill restricted imports of firearms, a benefit for domestic manufacturers, yet
the NRA consistently opposed the bill. The Dodd bill also potentially benefited retailers of
firearms and ammunition by controlling mail order sales, thus reducing competition for most
retailers. On the first day of the 1968 hearings, Sen. Dodd announced the support of several
manufacturers of firearms. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 2. This constituted a major
break with the NRA position.
110. E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 2 (1960).
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often times characterizing the proposed legislation as being far more restrictive
than it in fact was.111
The crime control paradigm dominated and framed the policy
discussion.112 In the early hearings, the impact on crime of sales to out-of-state
residents by mail order and over the counter transactions received considerable
attention.113 As hearings progressed, advocates repeatedly stressed the number
of killings with guns and rising crime rates. The evidence most cited was the
low crime rates in nations with strong gun control laws and the relatively low
homicide rate in New York and other high control environments compared to
Houston, Phoenix, and other low control cities.114 Advocates also raised
sovereignty and social order arguments when addressing militant groups and
the riots.115 The examination of interstate movement of firearms to thwart state
restrictions more closely approximated policy analysis than did other testimony
to the various committees.
Destructive devices and machine guns received substantial attention in the
1965 Senate hearings, even though there was very little controversy about
controlling the former and the latter was already under federal legal control.116
After the reports of sniping during the Newark and Detroit riots the focus
shifted more toward social order.117 On occasions, proponents challenged the
most sacred sovereignty argument of opponents by questioning their
interpretation of the Second Amendment as an absolute, individual right.118
They did not, however, rely heavily upon a sovereignty argument, even when
opponents continually cited potential impact on hypothetical individuals.
Advocates showed little interest in challenging the legitimacy of applying
individual level analysis to public policy or the language of individual rights.
Instead, they generally attempted to minimize the potential impact of proposals
on individuals. No doubt, this reflected the discomfort most American feel
with collective rights and state authority.

111. See NRA bulletin (Apr. 9, 1965) (in reference to S. 1592).
112. See VIZZARD, supra note 1, at 345 for a detailed description of the four paradigms of
gun control: sovereignty, cultural, crime control, and public health.
113. See 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 274-81 (statement of Carl Miller, Chicago Police
Dept.), at 343-73 (statement of Richard R. Caples, Comm., Dept. of Pub. Safety, Boston, Mass.),
at 394-407 (statement of Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General) and at 495-503 (statement of James V.
Bennett).
114. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 615-57 (statement of Ramsey Clark), at 88-103
(statement of John V. Lindsay) and at 113-18 (statement of John Glenn, Jr.).
115. 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 997-99 (statement of Richard J. Hughes).
116. See 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 133-60 (statement of Merton Howe) and at 160185 (statement of J. C. Gonzalez).
117. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 997-1030 (statement of Richard J. Hughes) and at
1052-1062 (statement of Quinn Tamm).
118. 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 566 (statement of Lawrence Speiser).
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Gun control opponents also addressed the crime control paradigm with
arguments that criminals would never comply with any gun law and cited the
homicide rate in low control cities such as Milwaukee.119 Yet opponents
proved far more willing than advocates to shift from crime control to other
conceptual frameworks. The favorite argument was the sovereignty/individual
rights paradigm. Although opponents occasionally used self-defense as a
means of invoking this context, they more often addressed individual rights.
Repeatedly, opponents characterized the impact of proposed legislation as
denying rights to individual gun owners.120 In addition, opponents argued that
the federal government would be intruding into the sovereignty of the states.121
Curiously, some opponents concurrently advocated HR6137, a bill that would
have made virtually every violent crime involving a firearm a federal
offense.122 For opponents, several key symbols were clearly of paramount
importance. New York’s Sullivan Law provided the ultimate symbol of
evil.123 The symbol took on added importance during the period when New
Jersey passed a permissive licensing law that covered both long guns and
Opponents repeatedly invoked the symbols of freedom,
handguns.124
individual rights and the Constitution. During the 1965 hearings, advocates
displayed destructive devices such as rocket launchers, presumably in an effort
to symbolically demonize the firearm trade.
No clear winner emerged from the gun control policy battle of the 1960s.
Control advocates succeeded in passing the GCA, largely due to events
external to the policy arena. At first inspection, the law appears to constitute a
significant policy shift. Measured by impact, however, the policy shift appears
more incremental than radical. At the law’s passage, control advocates
expressed concern with the fact that over 100,000 individuals and corporations
held federal firearms licenses, and that at least a quarter of these licensees were
not legitimately engaged in business.125 Nearly three decades later, the number
of dealer licenses had increased nearly three-fold with the majority still issued
119. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 468-526 (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
120. See 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 185-94 (statement of Harry R. Woodward), at 195215 (statement of Franklin Orth), at 241-43 (statement of Sen. Paul Fannin), at 247-54 (statement
of Sen. Gordon Allott), at 254-58 (statement of Thomas Kimball) and at 269-71 (statement of
Harmon C. Leonard). See also 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 156-58 (statement of John
Saylor), at 152-56 (statement of Sen. John Dingell), at 438-44 (statement of Harold Glassen), at
584-91 (statement of Robert Dennis) and at 598-604 (statement of James Jungroth).
121. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 662 (statement of Neal Knox). See also 1968
Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 395 (statement of Franklin Orth); and 1967 Hearings, supra note 14
at 152-56 (statement of Sen. John Dingell).
122. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 634 (statement of Leon C. Jackson).
123. Id. at 418, 504, 507 and 646; 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 202, 473 and 542.
124. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 190, 201.
125. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 40 (statement of Under Secretary of the Treasury
Joseph J. Barr).
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to persons not legitimately engaged in business.126 The volume of firearm
sales continued to increase after the passage of the law,127 and few effective
restrictions were placed on unlicensed traffickers in firearms.128 Although
activity by both advocates and opponents declined briefly with the passage of
the GCA, soon both sides renewed their activities.
The failure to pass more restrictive and comprehensive legislation, despite
the alignment of public opinion, a sympathetic press and active administration
support, raises a most interesting policy question. Although many have
attributed this result entirely to the institutional power of the NRA, the record
suggests more complex answers. At the Senate subcommittee level, personal
conflicts between the ranking minority and majority members prevented
compromise.129 The full committee split evenly between support and
opposition, but the chair opposed gun control.130 Since the primary momentum
for action resided in the Senate, this severely reduced the probability of a more
restrictive bill emerging from committee.
The Senate presented particular structural problems for gun control
legislation. The issue broke down largely on rural versus urban lines. The
structure of the Senate provided rural legislators disproportionate power to
prevent passage of strict controls. A review of the hearings reveals that
numerous Senators and House Members from rural states felt a need to not
only oppose the Dodd and Administration bills but also to testify in committee
against them.131 The intense personal opposition of a few key members, such
as John Dingell and Robert Sikes, reinforced the existing ideological and
political reservations of their rural and conservative cohorts.132 An additional
center of resistance formed around ideological conservatives. For example,
Strom Thurmond and Roman Haruska who opposed the prevailing view that
the Interstate Commerce Clause could be interpreted to give the federal
government power over acts within states.133
None of these obstacles might have proven insurmountable if public
opinion had been translated into a focused demand for action, but it did not.
With the exception of the short period after the Robert Kennedy assassination,
126. See COOK et. al, supra note 89. The numbers of licensees are documented by ATF
licensing figures and the relative proportion of “legitimate” dealers is confirmed by my
experience as a supervisory special agent with ATF until 1994.
127. GARY KLECK, GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 49-51 (1991).
128. See COOK ET. AL, supra note 89; VIZZARD, supra note 65.
129. VELDE, supra note 22.
130. Id.
131. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 163 (statement of Sen. Bourke Hickenlooper), at
415 (statement of Sen. Frank Church) and at 882 (statement of Sen. Peter Dominick).
132. Both served on the NRA Board of Directors.
133. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 635-50 (questioning of Attorney General
Ramsey Clark by Sen. Thurmond); See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 1018 (questioning of
Gov. Richard Hughes by Sen. Roman Haruska).
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the public displayed little active interest in the issue. Because opposition
crossed party lines, party discipline proved ineffective for advancing control
legislation, as it has until the early 1990s.134 Much as with civil rights before
the 1960s, a few key Democrats from southern and rural areas proved critical
to the opposition even when the Administration strongly supported a bill.
No doubt, the lack of preparation and organization on the part of policy
advocates, the administration and the bureaucracy played a significant role in
limiting their policy success. Political scientist Nelson Polsby cited the failure
to pass more significant firearms legislation in 1968 as a classic example of
failure of a policy initiative due to inadequate preparation by advocates.135 The
advocates lacked organization, and Vietnam and the War on Poverty occupied
the majority of the administration’s interest and resources. The jurisdictional
split between Treasury and Justice exacerbated the lack of preparation and
policy coordination by the bureaucracy.
That the passage of the GCA did not mark the beginning of an incremental
process of increasing control seems less surprising in retrospect than many
would have believed at the time. In many ways, 1968 marked the official end
of an era. The election of Richard Nixon signaled the reversal of a trend
toward an expanded federal role in domestic social policy, which began with
the 1932 election of Franklin Roosevelt. Although Nixon’s rhetoric on
decentralizing domestic policymaking and reversing the federal government
activism may have exceeded his actions, momentum had shifted. After a
caretaker Ford Administration, Jimmy Carter attained the presidency by
campaigning against the Washington bureaucracy, only to be defeated four
years later by the ultimate symbol of decentralization, Ronald Reagan. The
1970s brought the abolition of federal controls over airline fares and service,
shipping rates and saving and loan operations. Scholars began to question the
assumptions of interest group liberalism, and, by the end of the decade, many
embraced public choice theory.
Rather than the next incremental steps in gun control, the decade of the
1970s would see government emphasis shift toward implementation of existing
law, while interest groups, on both sides, solidified and intensified their
positions.136 If the measure of a policy change is the degree to which it
changes social behavior, then the policy changes of 1968 were modest.

134. Interviews with both current and former staff members of Congress cited the inability to
invoke party discipline as a key factor in the inability to pass firearms legislation prior to the
Brady Bill.
135. NELSON W. POLSBY, POLITICAL INNOVATION IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF POLICY
INITIATIONS 170 (1984).
136. VIZZARD, Cross Fire, supra note 59, at 52-6.

